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INTRODUCTION  
In the beginning of the 20
th
 century, art history did not seem to be of much relevance to 
the philosophy of art. Art was defined in terms of its function (mostly providing aesthetic 
pleasure through form) and was judged upon that basis. Not only avant-garde art 
challenged these ‘simple’ essentialist definitions. It was also urged that we cannot 
identify and judge non-Western artworks through our narrow Western paradigms like 
form and non-functional aesthetic pleasure. In order to understand the significance and to 
judge the value of an artwork, we need to know its historical context. The relevance of 
the history of art to the philosophy of art is fully acknowledged by Arthur Danto and 
Jerrold Levinson. They both formulate historical theories of art. It is claimed by Jerrold 
Levinson that arthood is dependent on the artifact’s relationship to past artworks, and 
thus to the history of art. Arthur Danto argues that (the resolution of) the history of art 
made it possible to define art philosophically. The question I want to address here is the 
place of non-Western art in these historical theories: how are these artifacts defined and 
valued as art? 
It will be shown that the place of non-Western art in these theories depends (1) on 
whether non-Western artworks are included in or excluded from art history and (2) on the 
view of history that is held. First, I will explore the attitude towards non-Western art 
within the philosophy of art and art history and the changing relationship between the two 
fields. I will show that this change made possible a fuller appreciation of non-Western 
art, without ending up in relativism. Then, I will examine Levinson’s definition of art and 
show what it entails for the categorization of non-Western art. I will argue that 
Levinson’s actual starting point is the Western history of art. It follows that non-Western 
artifacts are easily categorized as ‘artlike’ and this has damaging consequences for the 
evaluation of these artifacts. Thirdly, I will turn to Arthur Danto’s theory of art and show 
how it can account more fully for non-Western art, but is equally exclusionary as it 
excludes virtually all non-Western art from the history of art.  
 
Art history and the philosophy of art 
Contemporary philosophies of art need to take position regarding globalization; how can 
images, texts and sounds from other cultures be defined. Here, the philosophy of art faces 
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similar problems as (art) history. On the one hand, the history of other cultures can be 
seen through the matrix of Western history. Consequently, the histories of other cultures 
tend to become variations on the master narrative of European history with its scientific 
revolutions, Enlightenment and progress.
1
 Non-Western cultures will mostly turn out to 
be “figures of lack”.2 Seen through the matrix of Western history, their revolutions and 
progress will turn out to be less significant. Similarly, if we define and understand the 
artistic endeavors of other cultures through the matrix of the Western art history, we 
make the arthood of these artifacts fully depend on ‘our’ history. As it turns out that these 
artifacts do not completely correspond to this history, these artifacts are seen as ‘artful’ or 
‘artlike’, but not as art in the full sense. On the other hand, non-Western cultures can be 
perceived as profoundly different, only to be understood in their own terms. 
Contextualists take this stance: they claim that all artifacts should be interpreted and 
judged within their own historical and cultural context. Remarkably, this leads to a 
(different) form of cultural exclusion. Contextualists turn non-Western art into something 
totally alien to our artistic practices and that often implies making it unequal or else 
disregarding it.
3
 Contextualism, by judging art along cultural lines, can also have 
profound conservative consequences. Firstly, though unintentionally, Western art stays 
referential: all non-Western art is defined as art distinct from “our” tradition. Secondly, it 
can force the non-West to perform their pure “otherness”.4 It essentializes cultures and 
cultural recognition turns into cultural pressure: members of a culture are not only 
allowed to perform their cultural practices, but are obliged to do this.
5
 Their artifacts will 
be labeled as art only insofar as they represent their ‘authentic’ culture. From 
contextualism, it follows that there is no coherent universal concept of art and non-
Western artifacts are excluded from arthood as we understand the concept.  
The intensified confrontation with globalization in general and non-Western art in 
particular begged the question: are art and artistic value concepts of transhistorical and 
transcultural significance or are they only referring to a specific Western phenomenon 
from the Renaissance onwards? If all non-Western artifacts are excluded from “arthood” 
and art is simply equated with post-Renaissance, self-conscious art making then this, on 
the one hand, makes a concept with a positive value connotation, in the sense that good 
art is worthwhile, exclusive to Western societies. On the other hand, it renders the 
concept of art highly Eurocentric and thus of limited relevance in a globalised world. 
Beyond that, it is empirically hard to maintain that no other society beyond the post-
Renaissance Western society had art.
6
 Hence, in order to define and judge all art, we need 
a theory of art and artistic value that can accommodate artifacts from all cultures and 
times.  
Most theories of art aim to do this. Formalism provides us with a good example. 
Formalists claim that the essential feature of art is (aesthetic) form, and artistic value 
should be judged on that basis.
7
 Modern art and “primitive” artifacts can be judged 
artistically side by side on account of decontextualized formal (aesthetic) similarity 
between them.
8
 But to define and understand non-Western art only in the light of formal 
and aesthetic qualities degrades its specific cultural and social context.
9
 Formalism seems 
to be able to include non-Western and other non-canonical art, but it renders arthood 
dependent on very narrow Western standards. The principle of formal similarity confirms 
the cultural dominance of the West rather than it leads to the emancipation the formalists 
intended.
10
 The arthood of the artistic endeavors of other cultures is derived from the 
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masterpieces of Western culture and arthood is bestowed on them only through the 
matrix of our history of art. 
Jerrold Levinson and Arthur Danto seem to avoid the pitfalls of both contextualism and 
formalism. Contra formalism, they claim that we cannot bestow arthood upon artifacts 
because of their formal aesthetic properties.
11
 It does not follow that art has no essence. 
Levinson argues that, for an artifact to be art, it must be seriously intended for regard-as-
a-work-of-art, i.e., intended for it to be regarded in any way preexisting artworks are or 
were correctly regarded. Formal similarity between artworks is not sufficient, as the 
relationship between future and preceding art must be historical and intentional.
12
 Thus, 
an artwork is only correctly regarded in light of its true history of production.
13
 It follows 
that non-Western objects cannot be art due to their formal similarity with modern 
Western art. An African artist from the 18
th
 century cannot have intended to make an 
artifact that would invoke similar regards as a 20
th
 century painting by Picasso. These 
non-Western artifacts can be art, but only because they were intended for similar regards 
as historically preceding artworks. A similar view can be found in Danto’s philosophy of 
art. He states that formal affinity between modern art and non-Western artifacts cannot 
account for the arthood of the latter. Affinity is only relevant when there is a causal, and 
thus historical, relationship.
14
 It does not follow that Levinson and Danto claim that there 
is no art beyond Western post-Renaissance art. Both argue that an artmaker does not need 
to be conscious of the concept of art. Danto acknowledges that the distinction between 
artifact and art is not lexically marked in the vocabularies of African languages generally, 
but claims that the absence of lexical markers can hardly be taken as evidence that the 
distinction cannot be made or that it is not made in the linguistic community in 
question.
15
 Levinson also accepts the possibility that someone who does not know the 
concept of an artwork can make an artifact that we would have no conceptual difficulty 
regarding it as an artwork.
16
 Their insistence on the historicity of art does not lead to 
relativism: their theories try to make a valid distinction between art and non-art 
universally. Their definition should not only be applicable to Western art, but to all art.  
In short, these historical theories of art try to identify and understand art within its context 
without throwing out the idea of a transhistorical and transcultural concept of art. They 
do this by combining historicism and essentialism. Both Danto and Levinson underwrite 
historicism, i.e. the idea that art is not the same throughout time and space and is 
historically conditioned, but also argue that this does not entail that art has no universal 
essence. Both relate historicism and essentialism in different ways and this leads to very 
different outcomes for the place of non-Western art in their theories. I will first turn to the 
historical intentional definition of Jerrold Levinson.  
 
Levinson’s Historicism and Art’s Definition  
Levinson argues that historicity is the essence of art. Levinson clearly explains: “So what 
I mean by historicism with regard to the concept of art, at least in this context, is […] the 
conviction that the only common core of art applicable to art-making today and two 
thousand years ago, and to any activities and artifacts of other cultures we recognize 
without strain as evidencing art-making – is one which makes historical reference or 
connectedness, that is, reference or connectedness to predecessor works, activities, modes 
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of reception, internal to the idea of art-making itself”.17 An object is art when it is or was 
intended or projected for overall regard as some prior art is or was correctly regarded.
18
 
Thus, arthood depends on the intended relationship of the object with the preceding 
history of art. Levinson defends the separation between the tasks of defining and 
evaluating art.
19
 It follows that to be art is a “neutral” state, and does not imply that it is 
worthwhile. On the other hand, Levinson makes a connection between the way in which 
art is defined and evaluated. Levinson claims that his theory allows concrete standards of 
evaluation to be derived from criteria of membership. Good artworks, Levinson argues, 
give at least initially similar rewards as past good artworks.
20
 
His historical definition does not lead the idea that arthood and art content change over 
time. An artifact is art only due to it being intended for the same kinds of regard as 
preceding artworks. When an artifact invokes the same kinds of regard as future 
artworks, it does not follow that the artifact becomes art only after these future artworks 
came into existence. The African artifacts that inspired Picasso, do not become art 
because they can invite the same kinds of regard as Picasso’s art. The artifacts were art 
all along, because they were intended for inviting similar regards as art that preceded 
them, or the artifacts were never art in the first place. When an artifact is a source of 
inspiration to future artists, it is not granted arthood because of this. Levinson calls this 
position “traditional historicism”.21 “Traditional historicism” is committed to an 
exclusive role for preceding, rather than succeeding, historical context in the generation 
of an artifact’s status as art and its artistic content.22 Then, how can we find out whether, 
for example, the African artifacts that inspired Picasso are art? It is to this question I will 
now turn.  
 
Accommodating for non-Western Art 
Levinson insists that if another culture has art, it must be art in our sense more or less.
23
 
The obvious question is: what is art in our sense? What is art now and what has been art 
in the past is historically contingent to Levinson; the arthood of an object cannot be 
determined by its intrinsic characteristics. How, then, can non-Western art be related to 
what art is in our sense? Levinson offers two solutions to this problem. One strategy for 
assimilating to the intentional-historical conception of art phenomena outside the purview 
of Western fine art, Levinson argues, is to take the concrete totality of art regards that 
have accumulated in three thousand years or so of our common culture, all those 
relatively replete regards intending an object for which – or against which, in the case of 
revolutionary art – qualifies it as art, and seek to locate them in operation in those other 
domains, e.g., that of handmade furniture, or sculpted masks, or commercial design, or 
ritual music, or baton-twirling.
24
 The other, weaker, strategy for assimilating non-
paradigm art phenomena to the intentional-historical picture, Levinson goes on, is to 
attempt to identify in other domains simply the same structure of connectedness, of 
intentional invocation, whether immediate or mediate, of predecessor objects of the 
treatments they were accorded. If found, Levinson states, this would be some reason for 
thinking of those other domains as art-like, or as containing analogs of art, while perhaps 
not being strictly art in the particular, historicized sense it has acquired in our culture, and 
in which our culture is, in all its concreteness, and for better or worse, ineliminably 
implicated.
25
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Levinson’s first strategy contradicts his traditionalism and historicism. Traditionalism 
entails that only preceding regards are relevant to the arthood of an artifact and 
historicism implies that an artifact must be historically related to preceding art. For an 
artifact to be accorded arthood, it is not sufficient that there are preceding artworks that 
invite similar regards: the artifact must be intended for these regards. As such, the 
candidate for art and the preceding artworks must be historically related. On the problem 
of forgeries, Levinson claims that an original is correctly regarded only in the light of its 
true history of production, but a forger cannot rationally intend a forgery to be accorded 
the original regards as such.
26
 Thus, a forgery is not art, because it was not intended for 
similar regards as preceding artworks. It was intended for people to believe that it was the 
original artwork and that is not a correct way of regarding an artwork. Non-Western or 
art-unconscious art, i.e. art that was made by makers who are unaware of the concept of 
art, is granted art status in reference to the concrete totality of art regards that have 
accumulated in three thousand years. But, then this art is not correctly regarded in the 
light of its true history of production. He takes together all possible art regards, while as a 
historicist he claims that not all art regards are valid at the same time and as a 
traditionalist he claims that we can only take into account the preceding art regards that 
were known to the maker. This means that these “correct regards” cannot be translocated 
in another cultural and historical setting. Moreover, connecting non-Western art to the art 
regards of “our common culture” leads to a form of appropriation: the inclusion of non-
Western art in the history of art leads to a reaffirmation of the superiority of Western high 
art and the inferiority of non-Western art that was “granted” a place in “our” history of 
art. Though his historicist position on the one hand makes sure we do not include artifacts 
into the domain of art because of narrow Western concerns like form or non-functional 
aesthetic pleasure, as he starts from ‘our’ concept of art to accord arthood to artifacts 
from other cultures, arthood is, again, seen through the matrix of our concrete Western 
history of art.  
The second strategy fails to accord arthood to non-Western art in a robust and full-blown 
sense. Since we need to look for the same kind of connectedness between past and future 
non-Western artistic practices as in ‘our’ history of art, again, the Western history of art 
is the matrix through which we accord arthood to artifacts from other cultures. Though in 
his first article on the definition of art, Levinson starts from the idea that art-unconscious 
art is art, he later on weakens this claim: art-unconscious art mostly turns out to be 
“artful” or “art-like”.27 First, we need to address the question: what is “art-like”? 
Levinson claims it is easy to distinguish the purely craft, i.e. the purely functional, from 
the purely artistic, i.e. the non-functional, from the items in-between, not purely craft, and 
not wholly art.
28
 Here, he is clearly inspired by an aesthetic approach he tries to avoid, 
namely he uses the dichotomies craft/art and functionality/aesthetics. This appears to 
imply that Levinson knows what art is apart from a specific historical context. Levinson 
goes on “[…] factors that would dispose one to see a craft object as art would include 
whether it was fashioned by a single individual and reflected that individual’s personality 
and taste, the amount of care evident in the handling of detail, the degree of attention to 
form as part from fittingness to function as such, the sense of a statement being made or 
an attitude expressed. But note that these signs, which would dispose us to classify as art, 
are exactly ones which implicate familiar regards that paradigm artworks of the past have 
been standardly accorded”.29 He seems to make his own definition of art redundant, as we 
can accord arthood to artifacts on account of aforementioned intrinsic criteria. But, 
Levinson explicitly contests this idea. He does not want to provide intrinsic criteria for 
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‘hard cases’, like art-unconscious art and non-Western art. So, the idea that functional art 
from other cultures is “not strictly art” and thus art to a lesser degree because of its 
functionality seems to contradict his own definition. Secondly, what does it mean for an 
artifact to be accorded the status of “artful” or “art-like”? They have a clearly inferior 
status to “art”. Levinson might argue that art is a neutral status, so no value judgement 
can be deduced from it. Still, he also, rightly, claims that in order for something to be 
judged, we have to know what we are dealing with.
30
 The artistic value of art is then 
clearly separated from and superior to the artistic value of something that is “art-like”. 
Again, artworks within the tradition of Western high art, also called “uncontested” 
artworks, become referential: art-unconscious art seems art-like when it is not historically 
related to future artworks that are part of the traditional history of art. When it is, as for 
example in the case of Gregorian chants, art-unconscious art is art plain.
31
 Gregorian 
chants can be historically related to later uncontested art, whereas a lot of non-Western 
art cannot. 
Levinson’s definition cannot handle the problems that art history as well as the 
philosophy of art faces regarding non-Western art. On the one hand, arthood is derived 
from ‘our’ concept of art and thus, from our concrete history of art. It follows that the 
arthood of non-Western artifacts can only be seen through the matrix of Western art 
history. On the other hand, Levinson’s definition cannot provide a coherent universal 
concept of art.  He has to adjust his definition in order the accommodate for non-Western 
art in ways that contradict the original formulation of it. The fundamental problem is that 
a purely historical definition of art cannot provide a point of departure: it cannot account 
for artifacts that seem to be a candidate for arthood, but that do not consciously refer to a 
collection of preceding ‘uncontested’ artworks. The art status of certain artworks is 
uncontested because of historical consensus. But, when there is no historical consensus, 
and this consensus is a rather arbitrary given, then we have no criteria to accord or not to 
accord arthood to certain artifacts. It follows that a minimal intrinsic characterization of 
art is necessary in order for his historical definition to work. This is why I will now turn 
to the philosophy of art of Arthur Danto. Unlike Levinson, Danto does not propose a 
purely  historical definition of art as he does not equate essentialism and historicism. 
Historicism is not the essence of art, according to Danto, but the intrinsic essence of art 
discloses itself through history.  
Danto’s Definition of Art 
Danto connects historicism and essentialism differently. Danto states: “As an essentialist 
in philosophy, I am committed to the view that art is eternally the same – that there are 
conditions necessary and sufficient for something to be an artwork, regardless of time and 
place. […] But as an historicist I am also committed to the view that what is a work of art 
at one time cannot be one at another, and in particular that there is a history, enacted 
through the history of art, in which the essence of art – the necessary and sufficient 
conditions – are painfully brought to consciousness”.32 Danto has not formulated a clear 
definition of art, but Noël Carroll has derived a definition from Danto’s thoughts, and 
Danto endorses this formulation. The definition states that something is an artwork 
regardless of time and place if it has a subject (i.e., it is about something) about which it 
projects some attitude or point-of-view by means of rhetorical ellipsis which ellipsis, in 
turn, engages audience participation in filling-in what is missing (an operation which can 
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also be called interpretation) where the works in question and the interpretations thereof 
require an art-historical context.
33
  
What are the consequences of his definition for non-Western art? Let us return to the 
African artifacts that inspired Picasso. Both Levinson and Danto agree that we cannot 
accord these artifacts arthood because that they resemble artworks of modern Western 
artists or that they inspired these artists. Danto argues that Picasso discovered that these 
African artifacts were in fact works of art, i.e. they were art all along, but this does not 
mean that any object that inspires us aesthetically becomes art: “Anything can become an 
object of detached aesthetic scrutiny – the teeth of a dead dog, […] but, whatever the 
appearances, the distinction between artwork and artifact, is absolute”.34 Moreover, 
Danto states that all art has the same philosophical structure. It follows that non-Western 
art is art in the full-blown sense, it is not merely ‘art-like’ or ‘artful’. Consequently, the 
artistic value of these artworks is not inferior to the value of Western artworks: “My 
point, then, is that Picasso discovered […] the fact that, whether known or not, the master 
carvers of Africa were artists, and that artistic greatness was possible for them, not simply 
within their own traditions, but against the highest artistic standards there are”.35  
Moreover, from the fact that many non-Western artworks are functional, it does not 
follow that they are ‘art to a lesser degree’. About these uses of artworks, Danto states 
“Their uses may even form the basis for their being works of art, since the meanings they 
condense and express may have to do with weaving or with planting, but taken up into a 
system of beliefs and symbols that constitute a kind of philosophy. In their capacity as 
works of art they belong to a different totality altogether than that into which they have 
entry as object of use”.36   
Danto does not ask for “art” to be “art in our sense”: what makes an object an artwork is 
the fact that it embodies, as a human action gives embodiment to a thought, something 
we could not form a concept of without the material objects which convey its soul. It is in 
this sense that the philosophical structure of, for example, African artworks is the same as 
the philosophical structure of artworks in any culture.
37
 Danto does not need to give 
strategies for assimilating to his conception of art phenomena outside the purview of 
Western fine art. Whatever problems Danto’s definition might raise, the structure of his 
definition makes sure that (1) arthood is not made dependent on ‘our’ history of art and 
(2) non-Western art and Western art are equally art. Uncontested artworks from our 
tradition do not become referential. Still, his historical philosophy of art is by no means 
unproblematic. His teleological view on history excludes non-Western art not from 
arthood, but from the history of art.  
Danto’s Historicism/Essentialism 
This transhistorical essence of art discussed above, everywhere and always the same, 
only discloses itself through history, according to Danto.
38
 The end and fulfillment of the 
history of art is the philosophical understanding of what art is. He parallels this history to 
the personal history of the individual. Everyone tries to achieve an understanding of 
oneself. We do this through the mistakes we make, the false paths we follow and so on. 
The first false path in art’s history was the close identification of art with picturing. The 
second false path was the materialist formalist aesthetics of Greenberg.
39
 The history of 
art was over once art itself raised the true form of the philosophical question, that is, 
according to Danto, the question of the difference between artworks and real things.
40
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Danto’s whole theory revolves around the problem of indiscernibles. His main point is 
that two indiscernible objects do not necessarily have the same object status. One can be 
an artwork, while the other is not or they could both be artworks, but with totally 
different artistic meanings. The true status and meaning of an object depends on its 
historical context. In this respect, there is a clear parallel between Levinson’s and Danto’s 
theory. According to Danto, the question of the difference between artworks and real 
things was formulated by Andy Warhol’s Brillo Boxes. This artwork showed that art and 
reality can be indiscernible.
41
 Danto argues it was the historical mission of art to make 
philosophy possible, after which art has no historical mission in the great cosmo-
historical sweep. The fulfillment of the history of art is the philosophy of art.
42
 The 
history of art has ended, but it does not follow that the practices of art will not continue. 
They simply go on existing without a goal. Art is now in a post-historical era and its 
activities no longer have any historical significance.
43
 The end of the progressive 
historical narrative is a liberating idea, or so Danto argues. It liberated artists from the 
task of making more history, from having to follow the “correct historical line”.44 
Historical significance ceased to be a factor in art criticism.
45
 The post-historical era of 
art is an era of pluralism. The arts are liberated, having handed the problem of the nature 
of art over to philosophy, to do what they wanted to, and at this precise historical moment 
pluralism became the objective historical truth.
46
  
In this way Danto’s philosophy of art, just as Greenberg’s formalism, fails to do justice to 
other developments in twentieth-century art, such as Russian Constructivism, Dada and 
Surrealism.
47
 In “historical times” there was a correct historical line: all the artworks that 
followed this correct historical line contributed to the history of art. Art that was not 
“historically mandated”, on the other hand, is excluded: surrealism, for example, did not 
move forward the (false) formalist Greenbergian narrative. Consequently, surrealism did 
not help the history of art forward, neither in the Greenbergian narrative, nor in Danto’s 
narrative. In the end, his theory is just as exclusionary as Greenberg’s except that Danto 
shows a way to recuperate “historically insignificant” art, as after the end of art, historical 
significance lost all meaning for art criticism. In this way, it seems to be 
nondiscriminatory: after the end of art every artwork deserves “equal judging”. Still, all 
art beyond the pale of history will never be able to participate in art’s own history and as 
such did not help to attain its goal. Not being able to participate in the historical mission 
of art undoubtedly diminishes the value of these “historically insignificant” artworks. 
Danto himself draws the parallel between the end of the history of art and endings of 
movies where people live happily ever after. The point is that the story of people living 
happily ever after will not be told, it is excluded from the movie. Formulating one 
historical goal for art, is denying all art that falls outside this history of participation in 
this history and of setting its own historical goals. A noteworthy consequence is that non-
Western art is not granted any specific role in the history of art, as these artworks do not 
seem to play any part in attaining art’s goal of attaining self-understanding. Danto’s 
teleological view follows from his ‘robust historicism’, a view explicitly contested by 
Levinson.  
Minimal Historicism vs Robust Historicism 
Both Danto and Levinson agree that one needs to know the historical context in which an 
object originated in order to know whether the object is art or not. But being part of 
history is a completely different notion in their philosophies. For Levinson, to be part of 
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the history of art means that there is a specific intentional historical link between an 
object and past art objects. Danto, on the other hand, grants art objects a place in the 
historical narrative only if they moved the history of art closer towards the resolution of 
the historical mission of art. History for Danto is Hegelian history: history moves towards 
a goal. Artworks can fall beyond the pale of history: they are art, but did not participate in 
the history of art. For Levinson, history does not have one such telos or goal. The study 
of history is simply the study of the past: any event in the past can be the object of 
historical inquiry. For Danto, art history had a goal and this goal has been attained, so the 
history of art is over. Levinson, on the other hand, wants to dissociate "the minimal 
historicism of art claimed by my theory from more robust historicisms of a Hegelian or 
Dantoesque sort, such as ascribe to the development of art an inherent goal, or view the 
development of art as governed by inherent laws of stylistic evolution".
48
  
For understanding an object in its historical context, Levinson sticks to “surface 
interpretation”. Past intentions and correct regards are in most cases suggested by the 
outward face of the object, its context of creation, the process by which it came about and 
the genre it appears to belong to. In cases of doubt, Levinson argues, people can be 
queried, journals consulted, etcetera.
49
 Surface interpretation must be scrupulously 
historical, and refers only to possibilities the maker or artist could have acknowledged 
without attributing to him knowledge of the human sciences of the future.
50
 Danto claims 
that surface interpretation is needed, in order to come to a deep interpretation of the 
object. A deep interpretation is one that is hidden from the one that is being interpreted.
51
 
Danto’s end of the history of art is a form of deep interpretation. Every artist who has 
contributed to the historical mission of art, is not aware of this. Only afterwards, one can 
interpret artworks in this way and put them together in this master narrative. In 
Levinson’s view, the history of art cannot end when art is still being made. The history of 
art is the narrative of objects that are related through historical intentions, but this 
narrative lacks a hidden structure or mission. 
One might wonder why philosophy, and more specifically “the question what art is”, 
would be the historical mission of art? Art historian and philosopher David Carrier states: 
“Why confine art to the task of self-definition, to the quest to determine what art is?”.52 
Danto’s idea of one unique historical reason for art follows from his view on narratives: a 
historical narrative should not be seen as possible way to tell a history; historical 
narratives are not just what historians construct. The end of art history as he identifies it, 
is not merely the end of one narrative, it is the end of this actual sequence of events in the 
world’s history. After the End of Art describes the nature of art, not just one way of 
telling art’s history.53 Danto is committed to narrativism de re – the belief that the history 
of art itself is narratively structured. Its having an end depends, then, not on Danto’s 
goals but on its own goals.
54
 Danto states: “It will be clear that, for me, a narrative is 
something actually lived, something realized in and as history, rather than […] merely the 
way historians organize event”.55 Danto claims that after the end of art, art is freed from 
art historical and philosophical imperatives. But this liberation is only possible through 
stripping away the possibility for art to set her own historical goals. The philosophy of art 
assures its own historical significance by being the discipline which defines art as having 
no historical significance.
56
  
It is noteworthy that Danto, in his book Analytical Philosophy of History (1965) opposed 
to just such a form of speculative or substantive history, i.e., a philosophy of history that 
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makes claims about the future. On the one hand, in this book he stresses that historical 
selection, i.e. the objects that are chosen for historical inquiry, is influenced by personal 
biases. Danto states: “[…] historical significance is connected with non-historical 
significance, and this latter is something which varies with variations in the interests of 
human beings. The stories historian tell must not be relative merely to their temporal 
location, but also to the non-historical interests they have as human beings. There is, then, 
if I am right, an inexpungeable factor of convention and of arbitrariness in historical 
description, and this makes it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to speak, as the 
substantive philosopher of history wishes to, of the story of the whole of history, or, for 
that matter, the story of any set of events”.57 Here, Danto ignores the idea that the whole 
history of art could be written, and certainly that we could claim this history has come to 
an end. Moreover, he claims: “[…] narrative organization is something that we do. Not 
merely that, but the imposition of a narrative organization logically involves us with an 
inexpungeable subjective factor. There is an element of sheer arbitrariness in it”.58  
On the other hand, Danto forcefully argues in Analytical Philosophy of History that 
historians can only talk about facts that are in their past. Talking about the future is not 
practicing history. He states “[…] we cannot, in brief, consistently have a complete 
historical account. Our knowledge of the past, in other words, is limited by our 
knowledge (or ignorance) of the future. […] So if philosophy of history is impossible, 
complete historical accounts are impossible as well, and historical accounts are thus 
essentially incomplete”.59 Giving a complete account of the history of art is exactly what 
Danto is trying to do in his book After the End of Art. 
Levinson seems to adhere the earlier, ‘analytical’ view of history developed and defended 
by Danto. This view is more beneficial to the place of non-Western art in art history: 
anything can be an object of historical inquiry and it follows that non-Western artworks 
do have a history in a full-blown sense. Levinson rightly contests the idea that the history 
of art has one historical mission and that there is, as a consequence, only one master 
narrative of art. Still, he does not fully acknowledge that the practice of history plays a 
big part in the constitution of ‘uncontested artworks’. The selection a historian makes is 
heavily influenced by personal (cultural and social) biases. This does not make their 
historical narratives incorrect, but when we derive uncontested artworks from these 
narratives, our selection will be quite subjective. As the collection of uncontested 
artworks is arbitrary and Levinson has to rely heavily on these artworks in order to 
identify non-Western art, his identification of them as ‘art’ or ‘art-like’ or ‘non-art’ is 
quite subjective also.  
Conclusion 
Arthur Danto and Jerrold Levinson both try to define art universally without ignoring the 
historicity of art. It follows that they should be able to include non-Western art, without 
projecting purely Western preoccupations in it. Still, both give special significance to 
artworks from the Western history of high art. Levinson resorts to these artworks in order 
to grant arthood to non-Western artworks that have no clear uncontested predecessors. 
Consequently, the arthood of these objects depends on our history of art and as many do 
not fit this history completely, they are called ‘art-like’ or ‘artful’. In Danto’s definition, 
Western high art does not seem to play such a big role. All art is art in the fullest sense. 
Still, the discovery of this essence of art, i.e. his definition, was made possible through 
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history. As it turns out, this history is, again, the Western history of high art. Though non-
Western art is art in the fullest sense, they are not granted any historical significance in 
Danto’s view. 
In order to accommodate for art universally, without making non-Western art inferior to 
Western high art, we are in need of a definition of art that adheres to a minimal 
historicism while also formulating minimal intrinsic criteria for arthood. Danto’s and 
Levinson’s definitions and theories have provided us with useful means to provide such a 
theory. Still, both Levinson and Danto exclude non-Western art from the center of the 
history of art. For Levinson, most non-Western art is called “art-like”. For Danto, all art, 
Western or non-Western, is art in the fullest sense, but he does exclude non-Western art 
from the master narrative of art history.  
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